The Argument from Marginal Cases: is species a relevant difference

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (32):225-235 (2011)
Marginal humans are not rational yet we still think they are morally considerable. This is inconsistent with denying animals moral status on the basis of their irrationality. Therefore, either marginal humans and animals are both morally considerable or neither are. In this paper I consider a major objection to this argument: that species is a relevant difference between humans animals.
Keywords Marginal Humans  Animals  Moral Status  Species  The Argument from Marginal Cases
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DOI croatjphil201111216
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