David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Metaphysica 12 (2):151-164 (2011)
The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge has been the subject of an enormous amount of discussion, but the literature is biased against recognizing the intimate relationship between these forms of knowledge. For instance, it seems to be almost impossible to find a sample of pure a priori or a posteriori knowledge. In this paper, it will be suggested that distinguishing between a priori and a posteriori is more problematic than is often suggested, and that a priori and a posteriori resources are in fact used in parallel. We will define this relationship between a priori and a posteriori knowledge as the bootstrapping relationship. As we will see, this relationship gives us reasons to seek for an altogether novel definition of a priori and a posteriori knowledge. Specifically, we will have to analyse the relationship between a priori knowledge and a priori reasoning , and it will be suggested that the latter serves as a more promising starting point for the analysis of aprioricity. We will also analyse a number of examples from the natural sciences and consider the role of a priori reasoning in these examples. The focus of this paper is the analysis of the concepts of a priori and a posteriori knowledge rather than the epistemic domain of a posteriori and a priori justification
|Keywords||a priori a posteriori epistemology scientific inquiry|
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References found in this work BETA
Graham Priest (2006). In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent. Oxford University Press.
Saul A. Kripke (1980/1998). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
Laurence BonJour (1998). In Defense of Pure Reason. Cambridge University Press.
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.
Christopher Peacocke (2004). The Realm of Reason. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Howard D. Kelly (2014). Heidegger the Metaphysician: Modes‐of‐Being and Grundbegriffe. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3).
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