Good Reasons

Abstract
This paper examines the semantics and pragmatics of the Japanese causal connective mono. We show that the meaning of mono has three components: a causal relation, an emotive attitude toward the causing proposition, and an indication that the causal relation is of high quality. Further, we show that the latter two components are not at-issue content but expressive content. A formalization is provided in terms of the analysis of mixed content in McCready (2010). Finally, the proposal is briefly compared with previous, informal, accounts of the meaning of mono.
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