Animals, Brains, and Spirits
Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):567-581 (1995)
| Abstract | This paper contains an overview of the significance of dualism for theism and a modal argument for dualism. It concludes with remarks on the relevance of the modal case on behalf of dualism for an intramural materialist quarrel between animalists and brain-identity theorists | |||||||||
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