A Sketch of a Presentist Theory of Passage

Erkenntnis 73 (1):133-140 (2010)
In this paper I look to develop a defence of “presentist temporal passage” that renders presentism immune from recent arguments due to Eric Olson. During the course of the paper, I also offer comment on a recent reply to Olson’s argument due to Ian Phillips. I argue that it is not clear that Phillips’ arguments succeed.
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Ethics   Ontology   Epistemology   Philosophy
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DOI 10.2307/40784455
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References found in this work BETA
Ben Caplan & David Sanson (2010). The Way Things Were. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):24-39.
John Bigelow (1996). Presentism and Properties. Philosophical Perspectives 10 (Metaphysics):35-52.

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