A Sketch of a Presentist Theory of Passage
Erkenntnis 73 (1):133-140 (2010)
| Abstract | In this paper I look to develop a defence of “presentist temporal passage” that renders presentism immune from recent arguments due to Eric Olson. During the course of the paper, I also offer comment on a recent reply to Olson’s argument due to Ian Phillips. I argue that it is not clear that Phillips’ arguments succeed. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,672 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesNatalja Deng (2013). Fine's Mctaggart, Temporal Passage, and the a Versus B‐Debate. Ratio 26 (1):19-34.
Alex Baia (2012). Presentism and the Grounding of Truth. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):341-356.
Jonathan Tallant (2009). Presentism and Truth-Making. Erkenntnis 71 (3):407-416.
Ernâni Magalhães (2011). Presentism, Persistence and Composition. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):509-523.
William F. Vallicella (2002). The Creation–Conservation Dilemma and Presentist Four-Dimensionalism. Religious Studies 38 (2):187-200.
Eric T. Olson (2009). The Rate of Time's Passage. Analysis 69 (1):3-9.
Joseph Diekemper (2005). Presentism and Ontological Symmetry. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):223 – 240.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2010-03-13Total downloads105 ( #5,553 of 549,069 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,185 of 549,069 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
