Moral authority and the deliberative model

Philosophical Studies 170 (3):555-561 (2014)
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Abstract

Gerald Gaus’s The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World is refreshingly ambitious. It seems to me that our field today is a little too eager to “[stay] on the surface, philosophically speaking” (Rawls 1999, p. 395; cf. 2005, p. 10). However, the scope of Gaus’s ambition complicates the critic’s task. When a philosophical work aims to present something as grand as a “theory of freedom and morality,” it seems plausible to think that the appropriate unit of analysis is the whole rather than any of its elements. This is especially so in the case of a book like Gaus’s, where the author’s philosophical acumen is well-matched to its objectives. Despite Gaus’s claims to be a fox (xiv),Numbers in parentheses without further citation information refer to Gaus’s The Order of Public Reason.The Order of Public Reason is a hedgehoggy work.A full-on assessment of Gaus’s book hence lies well beyond the scope of a single essay. My aims are consequently

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Robert B. Talisse
Vanderbilt University

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References found in this work

Political Liberalism.John Rawls - 1993 - Columbia University Press.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Political Liberalism.J. Rawls - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (3):596-598.
Inclusion and Democracy.Iris Marion Young - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.

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