David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Faith and Philosophy 5 (1):3-24 (1988)
In my paper, I defend a view that many would regard as self-evidently false: the view that God’s freedom, his power to act, is in no way limited by his essential properties. I divide the paper into five sections. In section i, I call attention to a special class of non-contingent propositions and try to identify an important feature of these propositions; in section ii, I provide some initial reasons. based in part upon the unique features of these special propositions, for thinking that God does have the power to perform actions which his essential properties entail he will never perform; in section iii, I call into question the assumption that a person has the power to do something only if it is logically possible that he will exercise that power; and, finally, in sections iv and v, I try to specify a sense in which divine freedom and the kind of human freedom required by the Free will Defense are in fact the same kind of freedom
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Tomis Kapitan (1991). Agency and Omniscience. Religious Studies 27 (1):105-120.
Edward Wierenga (2007). Perfect Goodness and Divine Freedom. Philosophical Books 48 (3):207-216.
Justin J. Daeley (2015). Divine Freedom and Contingency: An Intelligibility Problem for Theistic Compatibilists. Religious Studies 51 (4):563-582.
Thomas Talbott (1993). Theological Fatalism and Modal Confusion. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 33 (2):65-88.
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