Presentism and distributional properties

In Karen Bennett & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 7. Oxford University Press (2012)
Abstract
Ross Cameron proposes to reconcile presentism and truth-maker theory by invoking temporal distributional properties, instantiated by present entities, as the truth-makers for truths about the past. This chapter argues that Cameron's proposal fails because objects can change which temporal distributional properties they instantiate and this entails that the truth-values of truths about the past can change in an objectionable way.
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