David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):47-61 (2012)
I argue that it is possible to prevent (and to be praiseworthy for preventing) an unwelcome outcome that had no chance of occurring. I motivate this position by constructing examples in which it makes sense to explain the non-occurrence of a certain outcome by referring to a particular agent's intentional and willing behavior, and yet the non-occurrence of the outcome in question was ensured by factors external to the agent. I conclude that even if the non-occurrence of an unwelcome outcome is ensured, the agent whose action explains this non-occurrence is praiseworthy for preventing the outcome. My examples are similar in important respects to Frankfurt-type cases. In the second half of the paper, I discuss the relationship between my examples and Frankfurt-type cases involving both actions and omissions. I conclude that while I may be responsible for the consequences of an action even if those consequences are unavoidable, this is not necessarily so for the consequences of omissions
|Keywords||Prevention Responsibility for Consequences Responsibility for Omissions Frankfurt Cases|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
Harry G. Frankfurt (1969). Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):829-39.
John Martin Fischer (2006). My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
David Shoemaker (2015). Responsibility From the Margins. Oxford University Press.
Dana Kay Nelkin (2013). Replies to Critics. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):123-131.
Dana Kay Nelkin (2013). Replies to Critics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):476-491.
Similar books and articles
Jeremy Byrd (2007). Moral Responsibility and Omissions. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):56–67.
Randolph Clarke (1994). Ability and Responsibility for Omissions. Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):195 - 208.
Ishtiyaque Haji (1999). Indeterminism and Frankfurt-Type Examples. Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):42-58.
Eric Funkhouser (2009). Frankfurt Cases and Overdetermination. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 341-369.
Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield (2007). Finking Frankfurt. Philosophical Studies 135 (3):363--74.
P. S. Greenspan (1999). Impulse and Self-Reflection: Frankfurtian Responsibility Versus Free Will. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 3 (4):325-341.
Peter Vallentyne (2008). Brute Luck and Responsibility. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (1):57-80.
Katarzyna Paprzycka (2002). Flickers of Freedom and Frankfurt-Style Cases in the Light of the New Incompatibilism of the Stit Theory. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:553-565.
Rik Peels (2013). Does Doxastic Responsibility Entail the Ability to Believe Otherwise? Synthese 190 (17):3651-3669.
Maria Alvarez (2009). Actions, Thought-Experiments and the 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.
Suzanne Uniacke (1999). Absolutely Clean Hands? Responsibility for What's Allowed in Refraining From What's Not Allowed. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (2):189 – 209.
Bindu Madhok (2002). The Price of Frankfurt's Compatibilism. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:577-584.
Roger Clarke (2012). How to Manipulate an Incompatibilistically Free Agent. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):139-49.
Matthew Talbert (2011). Unwitting Behavior and Responsibility. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (1):139-152.
Added to index2012-03-06
Total downloads28 ( #140,705 of 1,906,946 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #468,570 of 1,906,946 )
How can I increase my downloads?