Presentism and truth-making

Erkenntnis 71 (3):407-416 (2009)
Abstract
Here, I defend the view that there is no sensible way to pin a truth-maker objection on presentism. First, I suggest that if we adopt truth-maker maximalism then the presentist can requisition appropriate ontological resources with impunity. Second, if we deny maximalism, then the presentist can sensibly restrict the truth-maker principle in order to avoid the demand for truth-makers for talk about the non-present.
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References found in this work BETA
Jc Beall & Greg Restall (2000). Logical Pluralism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
John Bigelow (1996). Presentism and Properties. Philosophical Perspectives 10 (Metaphysics):35-52.

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Citations of this work BETA
Sam Baron (2013). Tensed Supervenience: A No‐Go for Presentism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):383-401.
Giuliano Torrengo (2014). Ostrich Presentism. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):255-276.

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