David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):157-176 (2009)
There is widespread controversy about the use of intuitions in philosophy. In this paper I will argue that there are legitimate concerns about this use, and that these concerns cannot be fully responded to using the traditional methods of philosophy. We need an understanding of how intuitions are generated and what it is they are based on, and this understanding must be founded on the psychological investigation of the mind. I explore how a psychological understanding of intuitions is likely to impact a range of philosophical projects, from conceptual analysis to the study of (non-conceptual) "things themselves" to experimental philosophy.
|Keywords||intuitions psychology experimental philosophy conceptual analysis|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Brian Talbot (2013). Reforming Intuition Pumps: When Are the Old Ways the Best? Philosophical Studies 165 (2):315-334.
Similar books and articles
Henry Jackman (2005). Intuitions and Semantic Theory. Metaphilosophy 36 (3):363-380.
Kirk Ludwig (2010). Intuitions and Relativity. Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):427-445.
Renia Gasparatou (2010). Experimental Appeals to Intuition. Critica 42 (124):31-50.
Frank Hofmann (2010). Intuitions, Concepts, and Imagination. Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):529-546.
Joshua Knobe (2007). Experimental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 2 (1):81–92.
Joshua Alexander (2010). Is Experimental Philosophy Philosophically Significant? Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):377-389.
Simon Cullen (2010). Survey-Driven Romanticism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):275-296.
Jonathan M. Weinberg & Stephen J. Crowley (2009). Loose Constitutivity and Armchair Philosophy. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):177-195.
S. Matthew Liao (2008). A Defense of Intuitions. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):247 - 262.
Max Deutsch (2010). Intuitions, Counter-Examples, and Experimental Philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):447-460.
Added to index2010-02-27
Total downloads58 ( #30,178 of 1,139,988 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #21,994 of 1,139,988 )
How can I increase my downloads?