Studia Philosophica Estonica 2:157-176 (2009)
|Abstract||There is widespread controversy about the use of intuitions in philosophy. In this paper I will argue that there are legitimate concerns about this use, and that these concerns cannot be fully responded to using the traditional methods of philosophy. We need an understanding of how intuitions are generated and what it is they are based on, and this understanding must be founded on the psychological investigation of the mind. I explore how a psychological understanding of intuitions is likely to impact a range of philosophical projects, from conceptual analysis to the study of (non-conceptual) "things themselves" to experimental philosophy.|
|Keywords||intuitions psychology experimental philosophy conceptual analysis|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Henry Jackman (2005). Intuitions and Semantic Theory. Metaphilosophy 36 (3):363-380.
S. Matthew Liao (2008). A Defense of Intuitions. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):247 - 262.
Jonathan M. Weinberg & Stephen J. Crowley (2009). Loose Constitutivity and Armchair Philosophy. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2:177-195.
Simon Cullen (2010). Survey-Driven Romanticism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):275-296.
Joshua Alexander (2010). Is Experimental Philosophy Philosophically Significant? Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):377-389.
Joshua Knobe (2007). Experimental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 2 (1):81–92.
Frank Hofmann (2010). Intuitions, Concepts, and Imagination. Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):529-546.
Renia Gasparatou (2010). Experimental Appeals to Intuition. Crítica 42 (124):31-50.
Kirk Ludwig (2010). Intuitions and Relativity. Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):427-445.
Max Deutsch (2010). Intuitions, Counter-Examples, and Experimental Philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):447-460.
Added to index2010-02-27
Total downloads36 ( #33,034 of 549,117 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #6,081 of 549,117 )
How can I increase my downloads?