Quantitative Parsimony and the Metaphysics of Time: Motivating Presentism

In this paper I argue that presentism—the view that only present objects exist—can be motivated, at least to some degree, by virtue of the fact that it is more quantitatively parsimonious than rival views
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00617.x
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References found in this work BETA
John Bigelow (1996). Presentism and Properties. Philosophical Perspectives 10 (Metaphysics):35-52.
Michael Huemer (2009). When is Parsimony a Virtue? Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):216-236.
Thomas M. Crisp (2005). Presentism and "Cross-Time" Relations. American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1):5 - 17.

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Sam Baron (2014). The Priority of the Now. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:0-0.

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