Time for presence?

Philosophia 38 (2):271-280 (2010)
It is, I think, possible to generate a variation of McTaggart’s (Mind 17:457–474, 1908 ) paradox that infects all extant versions of presentism. This is not to say that presentism is doomed to failure. There may be ways to modify presentism and I can’t anticipate all such modifications, here. For the purposes of the paper I’ll understand ‘presentism’ to be the view that for all x , x is present (cf. Crisp ( 2004 : 18)). It seems only right that, at a conference devoted to McTaggart’s work on time, we continue to pursue new ways in which his now infamous arguments remain relevant to us today.
Keywords McTaggart  Presentism  Philosophy of time
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-008-9173-1
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Lisa Leininger (2015). Presentism and the Myth of Passage. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):724-739.

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