Introspection and change in Carnap's logical behaviourism

In the 1930s, Carnap set out to incorporate psychology into the unity of science, by showing that all cognitively meaningful sentences of psychology can be translated into the language of physics. I will argue that Carnap, relying on his notion of protocol languages, defends a physicalistic philosophy of psychology that shows due appreciation to 'introspection' as a strictly subjective, but reliable way to verify sentences about one’s own mind. Second, I will point out that Carnap’s philosophy of psychology not only takes into account overt behaviour, but must comprise neurophysiological processes as well. Last, I will show that Carnap aims to develop a philosophy of psychology that does justice to the ongoing changeability of scientific knowledge.
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2005.08.004
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1970). How to Define Theoretical Terms. Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.
R. Carnap (1956). The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1 (1):38--76.
Rudolf Carnap (1936). Testability and Meaning. Philosophy of Science 3 (4):419-471.
Carl G. Hempel (1980). The Logical Analysis of Psychology. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1--14.

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