David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy 71 (277):4-5 (1996)
How are we to account for the authority granted to first-person reports of mental states? What accounts for the immediacy of these self-ascriptions; the fact that they can be ascribed without appeal to evidence and without the need for justification? A traditional, Cartesian conception of the mind, which says that our thoughts are presented to us directly, completely, and without distortion upon mere internal inspection, would account for these facts, but there is good reason to doubt the cogency of the Cartesian view. Wittgenstein, in his later writings, offered some of the most potent considerations against the traditional view, and contemporary philosophy of mind is practically unanimous in rejecting some of the metaphysical aspects of Cartesianism. But anyone who repudiates Cartesianism shoulders the burden of finding another way to accommodate its apparent epistemological strengths
|Keywords||Argument Cartesianism Epistemology Self-knowledge Wittgenstein Wright, C|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
C. Macdonald, Barry C. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (1998). Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Nigel Pleasants (1997). The Epistemological Argument Against Socialism: A Wittgensteinian Critique of Hayek and Giddens. Inquiry 40 (1):23 – 45.
Zhenhua Yu (2006). Tacit Knowledge. Tradition and Discovery 33 (3):9-25.
Scott Scheall (2011). Later Wittgenstein and the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophical Investigations 34 (3):268-286.
Edward T. Sankowski (1978). Wittgenstein on Self-Knowledge. Mind 87 (April):256-261.
SANFORD C. GOLDBERG (1999). The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge. Synthese 118 (2):165 - 199.
Charles Kurzman (1994). Epistemology and the Sociology of Knowledge. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (3):267-290.
Sophia Vasalou (2009). 'The Mind as an Object of God's Knowledge': Another Cartesian Temptation? Philosophical Investigations 32 (1):44-64.
Sanford C. Goldberg (1999). The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge. Synthese 118 (2):165-201.
C. J. G. Wright (2000). Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press 101-122.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads33 ( #127,864 of 1,934,517 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #434,193 of 1,934,517 )
How can I increase my downloads?