David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 175 (1):101 - 122 (2010)
The motivation for McDowell’s conceptualism is an epistemological consideration. McDowell believes conceptualism would guarantee experience a justificatory role in our belief system and we can then avoid the Myth of the Given without falling into coherentism. Conceptualism thus claims an epistemological advantage over nonconceptualism. The epistemological advantage of conceptualism is not to be denied. But both Sellars and McDowell insist experience is not belief. This makes it impossible for experience to justify empirical knowledge, for the simple reason that what is not a belief cannot justify a belief. Nondoxastic experience, though conceptual, is still a Given. And what conceptualism gives us can only be a New Myth of the Given.
|Keywords||Conceptualism Nondoxasticism The propositional criterion of justification The doxastic criterion of justification Two senses of the Given The New Myth of the Given|
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References found in this work BETA
R. Rorty (1981). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton University Press.
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
René Descartes (1984). The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Cambridge University Press.
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