Emotional expressions of moral value

Philosophical Studies 132 (1):43 - 57 (2007)
In “Moral Luck” Bernard Williams describes a lorry driver who, through no fault of his own, runs over a child, and feels “agent-regret.” I believe that the driver’s feeling is moral since the thought associated with this feeling is a negative moral evaluation of his action. I demonstrate that his action is not morally inadequate with respect his moral obligations. However, I show that his negative evaluation is nevertheless justified since he acted in way that does not live up to his moral values. I then use this distinctive negative moral evaluation to distinguish agent-regret from guilt and mere regret.
Keywords agent-regret  emotion  moral luck
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DOI 10.2307/25471844
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Barbara Herman (1985). The Practice of Moral Judgment. Journal of Philosophy 82 (8):414-436.

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Citations of this work BETA
Philip J. Nickel (2007). Trust and Obligation-Ascription. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):309 - 319.

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