Gilbert Ryle

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008)
Abstract Although Gilbert Ryle published on a wide range of topics in philosophy (notably in the history of philosophy and in philosophy of language), including a series of lectures centred on philosophical dilemmas, a series of articles on the concept of thinking, and a book on Plato, The Concept of Mind remains his best known and most important work. Through this work, Ryle is thought to have accomplished two major tasks. First, he was seen to have put the final nail in the coffin of Cartesian dualism. Second, as he himself anticipated, he is thought to have argued on behalf of, and suggested as dualism's replacement, the doctrine known as philosophical (and sometimes analytical) behaviourism. Sometimes known as an “ordinary language”, sometimes as an “analytic” philosopher, Ryle—even when mentioned in the same breath as Wittgenstein and his followers—is considered to be on a different, somewhat idiosyncratic (and difficult to characterise), philosophical track
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    Laird Addis (2003). Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949): A Method and a Theory. In J. E. Gracia, G. M. Reichberg & B. N. Schumacher (eds.), The Classics of Western Philosophy: A Reader's Guide. Malden Ma: Blackwell Publishing.
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