David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 71 (5):683-695 (2004)
I reinterpret Bohr's attitude towards quantum mechanical formalism and its empirical content, based on his understanding of the correspondence principle and its approximate applicability. I suggest that Bohr understood complementarity as a limitation imposed by the commutation relations upon the applicability of the idealizations which had grounded the use of the correspondence principle. By discussing this interpretation against the contemporary background of discussions regarding “naïve realism” about operators (as observables), I suggest that a Bohrian view on the empirical content of quantum mechanical operators may provide a middle ground between complete contextualism and an untenable realism about quantum properties.
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Tjerk Gauderis (2014). To Envision a New Particle or Change an Existing Law? Hypothesis Formation and Anomaly Resolution for the Curious Case of the Β Decay Spectrum. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 45 (1):27-45.
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