David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Zombies are presently generating much discussion in the philosophy of mind and consciousness studies.2 For if a creature could be physically, functionally and behaviourally indistinguishable from humans (in the rich sense implied) yet lack conscious experience, then the theories of mind that tie the nature of the mental too closely to physical, functional, or behavioural conditions will seem to have left something crucially mental out of their theories. If having conscious experiences is necessary for being conscious – as these discussions assume – then the theories that cannot accommodate it will fail as theories of mind.
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