David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 23 (4):337-347 (2008)
The fact that humans have a special relationship to each other insofar as they belong in the same species is often taken to be a morally relevant difference between humans and other animals, one which justifies a greater moral status for all humans, regardless of their individual capacities. I give some reasons why this kind of relationship is not an appropriate ground for differential treatment of humans and nonhumans. I then argue that even if relationships do matter morally species membership cannot justify a difference in moral status. This has important implications because it removes one barrier to giving animals greater moral status.
|Keywords||Animals Moral status Reciprocity Relationship Species|
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Citations of this work BETA
Julia Tanner (2013). Contractarianism and Secondary Direct Moral Standing for Marginal Humans and Animals. Res Publica 19 (2):1-16.
Matthew H. Haber & Bryan Benham (2012). Reframing the Ethical Issues in Part-Human Animal Research: The Unbearable Ontology of Inexorable Moral Confusion. American Journal of Bioethics 12 (9):17-25.
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