Graduate studies at Western
Analysis 65 (287):229-233 (2005)
|Abstract||This paper replies to an argument due to Greenspan (1980) and to Morton (2002) against the view that emotions are perceptions of values. The argument holds that this view cannot make room for ambivalent emotions both of which are appropriate, such as when it is appropriate to feel fear and attraction towards something. This would make for a contradiction, for appropriate emotions are supposed to present things as they are. The problem, I argue, is that this line of thoughts forgets that things can have positive and negative aspects: something can both be dangerous and attractive, for instance.|
|Keywords||Emotion Metaphysics Perception Value Greenspan, Patricia S Morton, Adam|
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