Expectancy and rational action prior to personal fission

Philosophical Studies 153 (2):299 - 306 (2011)
Abstract
Some analyses of personal fission suggest that an informed subject should expect to have a distinct experience of each outcome simultaneously. Is rational provision for the future possible in such unfamiliar circumstances? I argue that, with some qualification, the subject can reasonably act as if faced with alternative possible outcomes with precise probabilities rather than multiple actual outcomes
Keywords Personal identity  Personal fission  Stage theory  Decision theory  Probability
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    John Perry (1972). Can the Self Divide? Journal of Philosophy 64 (7):463-88.

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