Mixed inferences: A problem for pluralism about truth predicates

Analysis 57 (3):209–210 (1997)
Abstract
In reply to Geach's objection against expressivism, some have claimed that there is a plurality of truth predicates. I raise a difficulty for this claim: valid inferences can involve sentences assessable by any truth predicate, corresponding to 'lightweight' truth as well as to 'heavyweight' truth. To account for this, some unique truth predicate must apply to all sentences that can appear in inferences. Mixed inferences remind us of a central platitude about truth: truth is what is preserved in valid inferences. The question is why we should postulate truth predicates that do not satisfy this platitude.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA
    Michael P. Lynch (2013). Expressivism and Plural Truth. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):385-401.
    Michael Scott (2010). Religious Language. Philosophy Compass 5 (6):505-515.
    Douglas Edwards (2011). Simplifying Alethic Pluralism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):28-48.

    View all 8 citations

    Similar books and articles
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    34 ( #43,048 of 1,088,811 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,666 of 1,088,811 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.