Truth pluralism and many-valued logics: A reply to Beall

Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):382-385 (2000)
Mixed inferences are a problem for those who want to combine truth-assessability and antirealism with respect to allegedly nondescriptive sentences: the classical account of validity has apparently to be given up. J.C. Beall's response is that validity can be defined as the conservation of designated valued (Beall 2000). I argue that since it presupposes a truth predicate that can be applied to all sentences, this suggestion is not helpful. I also consider problems arising from mixed conjunctions and discuss the deeper worry that the distinction between truth which does and truth which does not entail realism is inferentially irrelevant.
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00195
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Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2012). True Alethic Functionalism? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):125-133.

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