David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (2):269-284 (2003)
In the first volume of his recently published Antropología trascendental, Leonardo Polo proposes a transcendental distinction between metaphysics (understood as the study of the cosmos) and anthropology (understood as the study of the human being). In his view, these two sciences study distinct types of acts of being; the former studies the act of being of the physical universe (that is, the act of persistence), while the latter studies the act of being of the human person (that is, the act of co-existence). On the assumption that reality is distinguished by its various acts of being, Polo argues that anthropology can be properly labeled transcendental even though the traditional transcendentals of metaphysics (ens, unum, res, aliquid, verum, bonum, and pulchrum) differ from those of anthropology. The transcendentals of the human person are personal co-existence, personal freedom, personal intellection, and personal love. Co-existence, freedom, intellection, and love are transcendentals that are convertible with the act of being of the human being, because this act is personal, but not with the act of being of the cosmos, which is not personal
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