Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (2):101–132 (2003)
Mercy is a form of charity towards wrongdoers that justifies punishing them less severely than they deserve according to justice. Three main objections to mercy, or its exercise by organs of the state-that it is irrational, unjust and procedurally unfair-are addressed in the course of defending mercy as a value that has a place in deliberation about criminal punishment. The paper draws on both the communicative theory of punishment and aspects of existing legal practice in mounting this defence.
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DOI 10.2307/4545388
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Shawn Floyd (2009). Aquinas and the Obligations of Mercy. Journal of Religious Ethics 37 (3):449-471.

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