David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Environmental Ethics 6 (2):149-160 (1984)
Louis G. Lombardi’s arguments in support of the claim that humans have greater inherent worth than other living things provide a clear account of how it is possible to conceive of the relation between humans and nonhumans in this way. Upon examining his arguments, however, it seems that he does not succeed in establishing any reason to believe that humans actually do have greater inherent worth than animals and plants.
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Citations of this work BETA
H. Verhoog (1992). The Concept of Intrinsic Value and Transgenic Animals. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 5 (2):147-160.
Michel Dion (2000). The Moral Status of Non-Human Beings and Their Ecosystems. Ethics, Place and Environment 3 (2):221 – 229.
John O'Neill (2002). Wilderness, Cultivation and Appropriation. Philosophy and Geography 5 (1):35 – 50.
Michel Dion (2000). The Moral Status of Non‐Human Beings and Their Ecosystems. Philosophy and Geography 3 (2):221-229.
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