Environmental Ethics 6 (2):149-160 (1984)
|Abstract||Louis G. Lombardi’s arguments in support of the claim that humans have greater inherent worth than other living things provide a clear account of how it is possible to conceive of the relation between humans and nonhumans in this way. Upon examining his arguments, however, it seems that he does not succeed in establishing any reason to believe that humans actually do have greater inherent worth than animals and plants|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Michael Naas (2010). Derridas Flair (For the Animals to Follow...). Research in Phenomenology 40 (2):219-242.
Julia Tanner (2009). The Argument From Marginal Cases and the Slippery Slope Objection. Environmental Values 18 (1):51-66.
Chris Crittenden (1998). Subordinate and Oppressive Conceptual Frameworks: A Defense of Ecofeminist Perspectives. Environmental Ethics 20 (3):247-263.
Julia Tanner (2006). Marginal Humans, The Argument From Kinds, And The Similarity Argument. Facta Universitatis 5 (1):47-63.
S. F. Sapontzis (1988). On Justifying the Exploitation of Animals in Research. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 13 (2):177-196.
David E. W. Fenner (1998). Animal Rights and the Problem of Proximity. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 12 (1):51-61.
Julia Tanner (2008). Species as a Relationship. Acta Analytica 23 (4):337-347.
Matthew Pianalto (2011). Comparing Lives: Rush Rhees on Humans and Animals. Philosophical Investigations 34 (3):287-311.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads19 ( #71,180 of 722,826 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,982 of 722,826 )
How can I increase my downloads?