Berkeley's theory of abstract ideas

Philosophical Quarterly 28 (111):97-115 (1978)
Abstract
While claiming to refute locke's theory of abstract ideas, Berkeley himself accepts a form of abstractionism. Locke's account of abstraction is indeterminate between two doctrines: 1) abstract ideas are representations of paradigm instances of kinds, 2) abstract ideas are schematic representations of the defining features of kinds. Berkeley's arguments are directed exclusively against 2, And refute only a specific version of it, Which there is no reason to ascribe to locke; berkeley himself accepts abstract ideas of the former type. Locke's theory suffers from circularity and redundancy, Berkeley's from conflation of thought with imagination
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Claire Schwartz (2010). Berkeley et Les idées généraLes mathématiques. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 200 (1):31 - 44.
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