David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):109-48 (1998)
An exploration is given of neural network features now being uncovered in cortical processing which begins to go a little way to help bridge the ''Explanatory Gap'' between phenomenal consciousness and correlated brain activity. A survey of properties suggested as being possessed by phenomenal consciousness leads to a set of criteria to be required of the correlated neural activity. Various neural styles of processing are reviewed and those fitting the criteria are selected for further analysis. One particular processing style, in which semiautonomous and long-lasting cortical activity ''bubbles'' are created by input, is selected as being the most appropriate. Further experimental criteria are used to help narrow the possible neural styles involved. This leads to a class of neural models underpinning phenomenal consciousness and to a related set of testable predictions
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Citations of this work BETA
John G. Taylor (2001). The Central Role of the Parietal Lobes in Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (3):379-417.
Stephen L. Thaler (2014). Synaptic Perturbation and Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 6 (2):75-108.
J. P. Kline, G. E. Schwartz, Z. V. Dikman & I. R. Bell (2000). Electroencephalographic Registration of Low Concentrations of Isoamyl Acetate. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (1):50-65.
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