De Re And De Dicto: Against The Conventional Wisdom
Noûs 36 (s16):225-265 (2002)
| Abstract | Conventional wisdom has it that there is a class of attitude ascriptions such that in making an ascription of that sort, the ascriber undertakes a commitment to specify the contents of the ascribee’s head in what might be called a notionally sensitive, ascribee-centered way. In making such an ascription, the ascriber is supposed to undertake a commitment to specify the modes of presentation, concepts or notions under which the ascribee cognizes the objects (and properties) that her beliefs are about. Consequently, it is widely supposed that an ascription of the relevant sort will be true just in case it specifies either directly or indirectly both what the ascribee believes and how she believes it. The class of “notionally sensitive” ascriptions has been variously characterized. Quine (1956) calls the class I have in mind the class of notional ascriptions and distinguishes it from the class of relational ascriptions. Others call the relevant class the class of de dicto ascriptions and distinguish it from the class of de re ascriptions. More recently, it has been called the class of notionally loaded ascriptions (Crimmins 1992, 1995). So understood, the class can be contrasted with the class of notionally neutral ascriptions. Just as the class of notional/de dicto/notionally loaded ascriptions is supposed to put at semantic issue the ascribee’s notions/conceptions/modes of presentation, so ascriptions in the relational/de re/notionally neutral class are supposed not to.. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
J. L. Schellenberg (2005). The Hiddenness Argument Revisited (II). Religious Studies 41 (3):287 - 303.
Katalin Bimbó (2007). $LE^{T}{Rightarrow}$ , $LR^{Circ}{Wedgesim}$ , LK and Cutfree Proofs. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (5):557 - 570.
H. M. Malm (1989). Commodification or Compensation: A Reply to Ketchum. Hypatia 4 (3):128 - 135.
P. X. Monaghan (2010). A Novel Interpretation of Plato's Theory of Forms. Metaphysica 11 (1):63-78.
H. E. Baber (1987). How Bad Is Rape? Hypatia 2 (2):125 - 138.
Peter J. Taylor (1994). Shifting Frames: From Divided to Distributed Psychologies of Scientific Agents. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:304 - 310.
Tang Yijie & Yan Xin (2008). The Contemporary Significance of Confucianism. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 (4):477 - 501.
Kenneth A. Taylor (2003). Singular Beliefs and Their Ascriptions. In Reference and the Rational Mind. Csli Publications.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads20 ( #61,563 of 549,124 )Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,390 of 549,124 )How can I increase my downloads? |

