David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 85 (2):199 - 230 (1990)
The main thesis of this paper is that it is not possible to determine the nature of epistemic justification apart from scientific psychological investigation. I call this view the strong thesis of methodological psychologism. Two sub-theses provide the primary support for this claim. The first sub-thesis is that no account of epistemic justification is correct which requires for the possession of at least one justified belief a psychological capacity which humans do not have. That is, the correct account of epistemic justification must be psychologically realistic. The second sub-thesis is that it is not possible to determine whether an account of epistemic justification is psychologically realistic apart from scientific psychological investigation. After defending these subtheses, I point out some interesting consequences of the overall thesis which present a challenge to traditional epistemology.
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
Alvin I. Goldman (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Harvard University Press.
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Alvin I. Goldman (1994). Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):301-320.
James E. Taylor (1993). Scepticism and the Nature of Knowledge. Philosophia 22 (1-2):3-27.
Paul A. Roth (1999). Naturalizing Goldman. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):89-111.
James E. Taylor (1999). The Value of Epistemology: A Defense. Philosophical Papers 28 (3):169-185.
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