Epistemic justification and psychological realism

Synthese 85 (2):199 - 230 (1990)
The main thesis of this paper is that it is not possible to determine the nature of epistemic justification apart from scientific psychological investigation. I call this view the strong thesis of methodological psychologism. Two sub-theses provide the primary support for this claim. The first sub-thesis is that no account of epistemic justification is correct which requires for the possession of at least one justified belief a psychological capacity which humans do not have. That is, the correct account of epistemic justification must be psychologically realistic. The second sub-thesis is that it is not possible to determine whether an account of epistemic justification is psychologically realistic apart from scientific psychological investigation. After defending these subtheses, I point out some interesting consequences of the overall thesis which present a challenge to traditional epistemology.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00484792
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,280
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 39 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Alvin I. Goldman (1994). Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):301-320.
Paul A. Roth (1999). Naturalizing Goldman. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):89-111.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

41 ( #116,141 of 1,932,507 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

18 ( #36,800 of 1,932,507 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.