David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 85 (2):199 - 230 (1990)
The main thesis of this paper is that it is not possible to determine the nature of epistemic justification apart from scientific psychological investigation. I call this view the strong thesis of methodological psychologism. Two sub-theses provide the primary support for this claim. The first sub-thesis is that no account of epistemic justification is correct which requires for the possession of at least one justified belief a psychological capacity which humans do not have. That is, the correct account of epistemic justification must be psychologically realistic. The second sub-thesis is that it is not possible to determine whether an account of epistemic justification is psychologically realistic apart from scientific psychological investigation. After defending these subtheses, I point out some interesting consequences of the overall thesis which present a challenge to traditional epistemology.
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References found in this work BETA
William P. Alston (1988). An Internalist Externalism. Synthese 74 (3):265 - 283.
William P. Alston (1985). Concepts of Epistemic Justification. The Monist 68 (1):57-89.
William P. Alston (1986). Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology. Philosophical Topics 14 (1):179-221.
Laurence BonJour (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
Stewart Cohen (1984). Justification and Truth. Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.
Citations of this work BETA
Alvin I. Goldman (1994). Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):301-320.
James E. Taylor (1993). Scepticism and the Nature of Knowledge. Philosophia 22 (1-2):3-27.
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Jane Duran (1988). Causal Reference and Epistemic Justification. Philosophy of Science 55 (2):272-279.
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