Who's afraid of determinism? Rethinking causes and possibilities

In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. 257--277 (2002)
Abstract
Incompatibilism, the view that free will and determinism are incompatible, subsists on two widely accepted, but deeply confused, theses concerning possibility and causation: (1) in a deterministic universe, one can never truthfully utter the sentence "I could have done otherwise," and (2) in such universes, one can never really take credit for having caused an event, since in fact all events have been predetermined by conditions during the universe's birth. Throughout the free will
Keywords Cause  Determinism  Free Will  Possibility
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Bernard Berofsky (2006). Global Control and Freedom. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):419-445.
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