Graduate studies at Western
Inquiry 49 (2):148 – 157 (2006)
|Abstract||Peter Winch's famous argument in "The Universalizability of Moral Judgments" that moral judgments are not always universalizable is widely thought to involve an essentially sceptical claim about the limitations of moral theories and moral theorising more generally. In this paper I argue that responses to Winch have generally missed the central positive idea upon which Winch's argument is founded: that what is right for a particular agent to do in a given situation may depend on what is and is not morally possible for them. I then defend the existence of certain genuine moral necessities and impossibilities in order to show how certain first-person moral judgements may be essentially personal.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Guy Kahane, Katja Wiech, Nicholas Shackel, Miguel Farias, Julian Savulescu & Irene Tracey (2012). The Neural Basis of Intuitive and Counterintuitive Moral Judgement. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 7 (4):393-402.
Howard Mounce (2011). Winch and Anscombe on Ethics and Religion. Philosophical Investigations 34 (3):241-248.
Peter Vallentyne (1992). Moral Dilemmas and Comparative Conceptions of Morality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):117-124.
Peter Winch (1965). The Universalizability of Moral Judgements. The Monist 49 (2):196-214.
Todd Bernard Weber (2002). The Moral Dilemmas Debate, Deontic Logic, and the Impotence of Argument. Argumentation 16 (4):459-472.
Jurriaan De Haan (2001). The Definition of Moral Dilemmas: A Logical Problem. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):267-284.
Nick Zangwill (1999). Dilemmas and Moral Realism. Utilitas 11 (01):71-.
Frederik Kaufman (1992). Moral Realism and Moral Judgments. Erkenntnis 36 (1):103 - 112.
Lilian Alweiss (2003). On Moral Dilemmas: Winch, Kant and Billy Budd. Philosophy 78 (2):205-218.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads27 ( #51,783 of 740,333 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,960 of 740,333 )
How can I increase my downloads?