The Conceptual Problem of Other Bodies

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):201-217 (2010)
Abstract
The, so called, ‘conceptual problem of other minds’ has been articulated in a number of different ways. I discuss two, drawing out some constraints on an adequate account of the grasp of concepts of mental states. Distinguishing between behaviour-based and identity-based approaches to the problem, I argue that the former, exemplified by Brewer and Pickard, are incomplete as they presuppose, but do not provide an answer to, what I shall call the conceptual problem of other bodies. I end with some remarks on identity-based approaches, pointing out related problems for versions of this approach held by Cassam and Peacocke
Keywords Philosophy of Mind  The Problem of Other Minds
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References found in this work BETA
Quassim Cassam (2007). The Possibility of Knowledge. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):125-141.
Donald Davidson (1987). Knowing One's Own Mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.

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