Graduate studies at Western
Inquiry 27 (1-4):143-145 (1984)
|Abstract||In a natural conception an action is a bodily event or event?sequence represented and caused by an active intention. The conception must be in accord with the conviction of psychophysical intimacy, concerning mental and simultaneous neural events. The obvious means of satisfying the conviction issues is overdetermination of certain neural events, and hence of actions. The correct conception of an action, in which an action is a bodily event or event?sequence caused by the lawlike neural correlate of an active intention, which neural correlate is not an effect of the intention, has the strengths of the natural conception without its weakness|
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