Exemplification and Universal Realism

Axiomathes 23 (2):261-267 (2013)
Abstract
The relation between universal and particular is considered to be the Achilles’ heel of universal realism. However, modern universal realism with facts does not have the difficulties which traditional Platonic universal realism had. Its exemplification relation connecting particulars and universals in atomic facts is very different from Platonic participation. Bradley’s regress argument against the exemplification relation can be refuted in two different ways. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to avoid the assumption of an exemplification relation and thus to go without the Achilles’ heel altogether
Keywords Universal Realism  Platonism  Naturalism  Nominalism  Facts  Connectors  Exemplification relation  Bradley’s regress  Bare particulars  Complexes
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    References found in this work BETA
    Erwin Tegtmeier (2009). Facts and Connectors. In M. Reicher (ed.), States of Affairs. Ontos Verlag. 30--71.
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