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- Richard Menary (ed.) (forthcoming). The Extended Mind. MIT Press.Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? In their famous 1998 paper "The Extended Mind," philosophers Andy Clark and David Chalmers posed this question and answered it provocatively: cognitive processes "ain't all in the head." The environment has an active role in driving cognition; cognition is sometimes made up of neural, bodily, and environmental processes. Their argument excited a vigorous debate among philosophers, both supporters and detractors. This volume brings together for the first time the best responses to Clark and Chalmers's bold proposal. These responses, together with the original paper by Clark and Chalmers, offer a valuable overview of the latest research on the extended mind thesis. The contributors first discuss (and answer) objections raised to Clark and Chalmers's thesis. Andy Clark himself responds to critics in an essay that uses the movie Memento's amnesia-aiding notes and tattoos to illustrate the workings of the extended mind. Contributors then consider the different directions in which the extended mind project might be taken, including the need for an approach that focuses on cognitive activity and practice.In my reading list | Discuss this book | Edit | Categorize |My bibliography
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This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist (...)
This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist (...)
Is consciousness all in the head, or might the minimal physical substrate for some forms of conscious experience include the goings on in the (rest of the) body and the world? Such a view might be dubbed (by analogy with Clark and Chalmers’s (1998) claims concerning ‘the extended mind’) ‘the extended conscious mind’. In this article, I review a variety of arguments for the extended conscious mind, and find them flawed. Arguments for extended cognition, I conclude, do not generalize to (...)
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Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words "just ain't in the head", and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We advocate a very different (...)
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| Discuss this article | Edit | Categorize | My bibliography | Export citation | Other links: consc.net cogprints.org era.lib.ed.ac.uk cogs.indiana.edu lps.uci.edu nyu.edu philosophy.wisc.edu cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk philosophy.ed.ac.uk wexler.free.fr citebase.eprints.org blackwell-synergy.com ingentaconnect.com | Scholar | More..
| | Other links: consc.net cogprints.org era.lib.ed.ac.uk cogs.indiana.edu lps.uci.edu nyu.edu philosophy.wisc.edu cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk philosophy.ed.ac.uk wexler.free.fr citebase.eprints.org blackwell-synergy.com ingentaconnect.com | Scholar | More.. In the movie, Memento, the hero, Leonard, suffers from a form of anterograde amnesia that results in an inability to lay down new memories. Nonetheless, he sets out on a quest to find his wife.
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| Discuss this article | Edit | Categorize | My bibliography | Export citation | Other links: cogsci.msu.edu philosophy.ed.ac.uk | Scholar | More..
| | Other links: cogsci.msu.edu philosophy.ed.ac.uk | Scholar | More.. In Cognitive Integration: Attacking The Bounds of Cognition Richard Menary argues that the real pay-off from extended-mind-style arguments is not a new form of externalism in the philosophy of mind, but a view in which the 'internal' and 'external' aspects of cognition are integrated into a whole. Menary argues that the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes cognitive processes and that cognition is hybrid: internal and external processes and vehicles complement one another in the completion of cognitive tasks. However, we cannot (...)
This paper explores the ramifications of the extended cognition thesis in the philosophy of mind for contemporary epistemology. In particular, it argues that all theories of knowledge need to accommodate the ability intuition that knowledge involves cognitive ability, but that once this requirement is understood correctly there is no reason why one could not have a conception of cognitive ability that was consistent with the extended cognition thesis. There is thus, surprisingly, a straightforward way of developing our current thinking about (...)
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It was a punchy paper by Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998) that brought a cognitive scientific notion of externalism to the attention of philosophers. Prima facie, Clark and Chalmers posed a somewhat banal question: ‘‘Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?’’ (p. 10). It was no surprise that their answer was deemed provocative by the journal’s philosophical audience. Six years on Robert Wilson, in an allusion to the now classic status of the Clark and (...)
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