What's wrong with enhancements?

Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (12):729-731 (2013)
As I read Paula Casal's excellent paper, ‘Sexual Dimorphism and Human Enhancement,’1 three thoughts kept circulating through my mind. First, I found myself largely in agreement with virtually everything she wrote. In particular, if Casal was being accurate and fair in writing that ‘Robert Sparrow alleges that those who…advocate biomedical welfare enhancements are committed to selecting only female embryos because women live longer than men,’1 then she has given compelling reasons for believing that that claim is, on reflection, as ludicrous as it first sounds! In fact, I can think of many additional reasons to those which Casal forcefully adduced for rejecting the view in question, but I do not see the need to present them here, given the abundance of sufficiently compelling reasons Casal already presented.Second, I confess that as I read Casal's article a strong feeling of shame washed over me in virtue of my being a man! Indeed, I found myself thinking that Jonathan Glover's important and chilling book Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century2 was misleadingly, and somewhat unfairly, titled. Heretofore, when I have read Glover's powerful book, which details many of the twentieth century's worst instances of large-scale crimes against humanity, I have often been overcome by a sense of shame of the actions of my species, homo sapiens; but Casal's article suggests that perhaps the scope of my shame has been too wide, and grossly unfair to the distaff members of our species! In the well-worked expression ‘man's inhumanity to man,’ the second use of the word ‘man’ undoubtedly extends to all humans, but the first use overwhelming picks out men insofar as it denotes the actual flesh and blood perpetrators of the horrific actions in question . Accordingly, perhaps a …
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DOI 10.1136/medethics-2012-100978
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References found in this work BETA
Susan Wolf (1982). Moral Saints. Journal of Philosophy 79 (8):419-439.
P. Casal (2013). Sexual Dimorphism and Human Enhancement. Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (12):722-728.
Larry S. Temkin (2008). Is Living Longer Living Better? Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (3):193-210.

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Allen Buchanan (2008). Enhancement and the Ethics of Development. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 18 (1):pp. 1-34.
S. Matthew Liao (2005). Are 'Ex Ante' Enhancements Always Permissible? American Journal of Bioethics 5 (3):23 – 25.
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