On negation, truth and warranted assertibility

Analysis 55 (2):98-104 (1995)
All parties to the proceedings that follow concur with DS. The question is whether there is anything more to truth than can be gleaned from DS alone. Deflationism holds that there is nothing more to truth than this. Now it would appear that 'warrantedly assertible' can play the role of T in DS. Hence it would appear that the deflationist would be able to identify truth with warranted assertibility
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DOI 10.1093/analys/55.2.98
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