David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia Mathematica 16 (1):100-112 (2008)
Michael Friedman maintains that Carnap did not fully appreciate the impact of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem on the prospect for a purely syntactic definition of analyticity that would render arithmetic analytically true. This paper argues against this claim. It also challenges a common presumption on the part of defenders of Carnap, in their diagnosis of the force of Gödel's own critique of Carnap in his Gibbs Lecture. The author is grateful to Michael Friedman for valuable comments. Part of the research towards this paper was carried out while the author was a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. The paper was presented to the Center's Fellowship Reunion Conference in Athens in 1992. It was committed for publication in the Proceedings of that conference, but those Proceedings never appeared. By the time it became evident that they would never appear, both the hard copy and the source file had been mislaid. The hard copy re-surfaced in 2007. The literature on this topic since 1992 appears to leave some space for the ideas and arguments presented here. Although the paper has been updated in light of the more recent literature, its basic thesis, presented in 1992, remains the same. Only 3 is new, questioning a basic presumption made by more recent commentators in their presentation of Gödel's criticism of Carnap in his Gibbs Lecture. For helpful comments on the current version, the author is indebted to Robert Kraut, Stewart Shapiro, and Adam Podlaskowski. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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