David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Mind 111 (443):551-582 (2002)
consistent and sufficiently strong system of first-order formal arithmetic fails to decide some independent Gödel sentence. We examine consistent first-order extensions of such systems. Our purpose is to discover what is minimally required by way of such extension in order to be able to prove the Gödel sentence in a non-trivial fashion. The extended methods of formal proof must capture the essentials of the so-called ‘semantical argument’ for the truth of the Gödel sentence. We are concerned to show that the deflationist has at his disposal such extended methods—methods which make no use or mention of a truth-predicate. This consideration leads us to reassess arguments recently advanced—one by Shapiro and another by Ketland—against the deflationist's account of truth. Their main point of agreement is this: they both adduce the Gödel phenomena as motivating a ‘thick’ notion of truth, rather than the deflationist's ‘thin’ notion. But the so-called ‘semantical argument’, which appears to involve a ‘thick’ notion of truth, does not really have to be semantical at all. It is, rather, a reflective argument. And the reflections upon a system that are contained therein are deflationarily licit, expressible without explicit use or mention of a truth-predicate. Thus it would appear that this anti-deflationist objection fails to establish that there has to be more to truth than mere conformity to the disquotational T-schema.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Hannes Leitgeb (2007). What Theories of Truth Should Be Like (but Cannot Be). Philosophy Compass 2 (2):276–290.
Cezary Cieśliński (2010). Truth, Conservativeness, and Provability. Mind 119 (474):409-422.
Carlo Nicolai (2015). Deflationary Truth and the Ontology of Expressions. Synthese 192 (12):4031-4055.
Carlo Nicolai (2016). A Note on Typed Truth and Consistency Assertions. Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (1):89-119.
J. Ketland (2010). Truth, Conservativeness, and Provability: Reply to Cieslinski. Mind 119 (474):423-436.
Similar books and articles
Panu Raatikainen (2005). On the Philosophical Relevance of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 59 (4):513-534.
Gregor Damschen (2011). Questioning Gödel's Ontological Proof: Is Truth Positive? European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1):161-169.
Robert F. Hadley (2008). Consistency, Turing Computability and Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem. Minds and Machines 18 (1):1-15.
Stewart Shapiro (2002). Incompleteness and Inconsistency. Mind 111 (444):817-832.
Richard Heck (2005). Truth and Disquotation. Synthese 142 (3):317--352.
Richard G. Heck Jr (2004). Truth and Disquotation. Synthese 142 (3):317 - 352.
G. Sereny (2011). How Do We Know That the Godel Sentence of a Consistent Theory Is True? Philosophia Mathematica 19 (1):47-73.
Glen Hoffmann (2007). A Dilemma for the Weak Deflationist About Truth. Sorites 18:129-137.
N. Tennant (2010). Deflationism and the Godel Phenomena: Reply to Cieslinski. Mind 119 (474):437-450.
Christopher Gauker (2001). T-Schema Deflationism Versus Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem. Analysis 61 (270):129–136.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads46 ( #90,667 of 1,796,218 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #98,118 of 1,796,218 )
How can I increase my downloads?