Deflationism and the Godel Phenomena: Reply to Cieslinski

Mind 119 (474):437-450 (2010)
I clarify how the requirement of conservative extension features in the thinking of various deflationists, and how this relates to another litmus claim, that the truth-predicate stands for a real, substantial property. I discuss how the deflationist can accommodate the result, to which Cieslinski draws attention, that non-conservativeness attends even the generalization that all logical theorems in the language of arithmetic are true. Finally I provide a four-fold categorization of various forms of deflationism, by reference to the two claims of conservativeness and substantiality. This helps to clarify the various possible positions in the deflationism debate
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    Henryk Kotlarski (1986). Bounded Induction and Satisfaction Classes. Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logik Und Grundlagen der Mathematik 32 (31-34):531-544.

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