Mind 119 (474):437-450 (2010)
|Abstract||I clarify how the requirement of conservative extension features in the thinking of various deflationists, and how this relates to another litmus claim, that the truth-predicate stands for a real, substantial property. I discuss how the deflationist can accommodate the result, to which Cieslinski draws attention, that non-conservativeness attends even the generalization that all logical theorems in the language of arithmetic are true. Finally I provide a four-fold categorization of various forms of deflationism, by reference to the two claims of conservativeness and substantiality. This helps to clarify the various possible positions in the deflationism debate|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Neil Tennant (2002). Deflationism and the Gödel Phenomena. Mind 111 (443):551-582.
Leon Horsten (2009). Levity. Mind 118 (471):555-581.
Richard Heck (2005). Truth and Disquotation. Synthese 142 (3):317--352.
Richard G. Heck Jr (2004). Truth and Disquotation. Synthese 142 (3):317 - 352.
J. Ketland (2010). Truth, Conservativeness, and Provability: Reply to Cieslinski. Mind 119 (474):423-436.
Christopher Gauker (2001). T-Schema Deflationism Versus Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem. Analysis 61 (270):129–136.
Jeffrey Ketland (2005). Deflationism and the Gödel Phenomena: Reply to Tennant. Mind 114 (453):75-88.
Cezary Cieśliński (2007). Deflationism, Conservativeness and Maximality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):695 - 705.
Cezary Cieśliński (2010). Truth, Conservativeness, and Provability. Mind 119 (474):409-422.
Added to index2010-08-11
Total downloads16 ( #74,686 of 549,087 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,317 of 549,087 )
How can I increase my downloads?