Frege's content-principle and relevant deducibility

Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (3):245-258 (2003)
Given the harmony principle for logical operators, compositionality ought to ensure that harmony should obtain at the level of whole contents. That is, the role of a content qua premise ought to be balanced exactly by its role as a conclusion. Frege's contextual definition of propositional content happens to exploit this balance, and one appeals to the Cut rule to show that the definition is adequate. We show here that Frege's definition remains adequate even when one relevantizes logic by abandoning an unrestricted Cut rule. The proof exploits the fact that in the relevantized logic, which abandons the unrestricted rule of Cut, any failure of the transitivity of deduction is offset by the epistemic gain involved in learning that a stronger-than-expected result holds
Keywords content  cut  entailment  harmony  intuitionistic logic  perfect validity  relevant logic  transitivity of deduction
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DOI 10.1023/A:1024203107491
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