Ratio 14 (3):263–280 (2001)
|Abstract||This paper addresses an objection raised by Timothy Williamson to the ‘restriction strategy’ that I proposed, in The Taming of The True, in order to deal with the Fitch paradox. Williamson provides a new version of a Fitch-style argument that purports to show that even the restricted principle of knowability suffers the same fate as the unrestricted one. I show here that the new argument is fallacious. The source of the fallacy is a misunderstanding of the condition used in stating the restricted knowability principle. I also rebut Williamson’s criticism of my argument for the claim that any proposition of the form ‘it is known that ϕ’ is decidable if ϕ is decidable.|
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