In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press (2009)
|Abstract||This study continues the anti-realist’s quest for a principled way to avoid Fitch’s paradox. It is proposed that the Cartesian restriction on the anti-realist’s knowability principle ‘ϕ, therefore 3Kϕ’ should be formulated as a consistency requirement not on the premise ϕ of an application of the rule, but rather on the set of assumptions on which the relevant occurrence of ϕ depends. It is stressed, by reference to illustrative proofs, how important it is to have proofs in normal form before applying the proposed restriction. A similar restriction is proposed for the converse inference, the so-called Rule of Factiveness ‘3Kϕ therefore ϕ’. The proposed restriction appears to block another Fitch-style derivation that uses the KK -thesis in order to get around..|
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