David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Inquiry 3 (1-4):185 – 198 (1960)
Effective objective (sachlich) verbal communication is dependent upon the use of linguistic locutions which are: a) suitable for some special purposes, b) clear ( i.e ., having a satsifactorily high degree of subsumability), and c) in accordance with some ordinary (i.e. , frequently occurring) language usages. Only in so far as point c is concerned is a study of actual language usage of (indirect) value to philosophers. And this holds true regardless of whether one's underlying assumption tends towards the view: 1) that ordinary language is perfect (Oxford), or: 2) that ordinary language is a mess (Oslo). In any case, one needs to know about the most ordinary usages to prevent unnecessarily drastic deviations from them. Drastic deviations may mislead the sender, as well as the receiver, create communicational disturbances, misunderstandings, and confusion (vide: Strawson's use of “presupposition"). However, considerations of a) suitability for special purposes, and b) clarity (subsumability) will most often, if not always, prevent a communicator from flatly adopting any one of the existing language usages of a given important linguistic locution. He would feel the need for: “explications,”; “rational reconstructions”; or conceptual alterations of one kind or another. In fact, there are instances where the sender finds it most advantageous to disregard completely ordinary language (vide: Einstein's use of “simultaneity"): He “makes words mean what he wants them to mean.”; This is the Humpty Dumpty sender attitude towards language. The corresponding receiver attitude manifests itself as awareness of and tolerance for language ambiguities.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Stanley Cavell (1958). Must We Mean What We Say? Inquiry 1 (1-4):172 – 212.
Bertrand Russell (1959). My Philosophical Development. London, Allen and Unwin.
Herman Tennessen (1959). On Worthwhile Hypotheses. Inquiry 2 (1-4):183 – 198.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Sebastian Lutz (2009). Ideal Language Philosophy and Experiments on Intuitions. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):117-139.
Francis Y. Lin (1999). Chomsky on the 'Ordinary Language' View of Language. Synthese 120 (2):151-191.
Sally Parker Ryan (2010). Reconsidering Ordinary Language Philosophy: Malcolm’s (Moore’s) Ordinary Language Argument. Essays in Philosophy 11 (2):123-149.
Oswald Hanfling (2000). Philosophy and Ordinary Language: The Bent and Genius of Our Tongue. Routledge.
Herman Tennessen (1965). Ordinary Language in Memoriam. Inquiry 8 (1-4):225 – 248.
Rollo Handy (1960). Doubts About Ordinary Language in Ethics. Inquiry 3 (1-4):270 – 277.
Avner Baz (2012). When Words Are Called For: A Defense of Ordinary Language Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
Gershon Weiler (1960). Is Humpty Dumpty Vindicated? Inquiry 3 (1-4):278 – 281.
Added to index2009-03-08
Total downloads9 ( #159,846 of 1,102,927 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #297,435 of 1,102,927 )
How can I increase my downloads?