Williamson's woes

Synthese 173 (1):9 - 23 (2010)
This is a reply to Timothy Williamson’s paper ‘Tennant’s Troubles’. It defends against Williamson’s objections the anti-realist’s knowability principle based on the author’s ‘local’ restriction strategy involving Cartesian propositions, set out in The Taming of the True . Williamson’s purported Fitchian reductio , involving the unknown number of books on his table, is analyzed in detail and shown to be fallacious. Williamson’s attempt to cause problems for the anti-realist by means of a supposed rigid designator generates a contradiction with arithmetic right away, upon instantiating the obviously relevant theorem that every natural number is provably odd or provably even. The paper also explains and formulates a globally restricted knowability principle, which likewise blocks the attempted reductio.
Keywords Fitch paradox  Knowability principle  Cartesian proposition  Restriction strategy  Polar propositions  Rigid designators
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DOI 10.2307/40586988
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References found in this work BETA
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.
N. Tennant (2001). Is Every Truth Knowable? Reply to Hand and Kvanvig. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1):107 – 113.

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