David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialectica 61 (3):395-415 (2007)
It is often claimed that emotions are linked to formal objects. But what are formal objects? What roles do they play? According to some philosophers, formal objects are axiological properties which individuate emotions, make them intelligible and give their correctness conditions. In this paper, I evaluate these claims in order to answer the above questions. I first give reasons to doubt the thesis that formal objects individuate emotions. Second, I distinguish different ways in which emotions are intelligible and argue that philosophers are wrong in claiming that emotions only make sense when they are based on prior sources of axiological information. Third, I investigate how issues of intelligibility connect with the correctness conditions of emotions. I defend a theory according to which emotions do not respond to axiological information, but to non-axiological reasons. According to this theory, we can allocate fundamental roles to the formal objects of emotions while dispensing with the problematic features of other theories.
|Keywords||Emotion Formal object|
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References found in this work BETA
Simon Blackburn (1998). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
Robert Campbell Roberts (2003). Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.
Bernard Williams (1992). Shame and Necessity. University of California Press.
William E. Lyons (1980). Emotion. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Pascal Engel (2013). Doxastic Correctness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.
Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2015). Emotions as Attitudes. Dialectica 69 (3):293-311.
Matthew Ratcliffe (2011). Depression, Guilt and Emotional Depth. Inquiry 53 (6):602-626.
Jérôme Dokic & Stéphane Lemaire (2013). Are Emotions Perceptions of Value? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):227-247.
Scott Alexander Howard (2015). Metaemotional Intentionality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
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