David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):361-372 (1995)
This is acknowledged by moral realists and non-cognitivists alike, but, for obvious reasons, they relate differently to this resemblance. For realists, it provides arguments, and for non-cognitivists, it provides potential trouble. Realists claim that the various points of resemblance between moral and factual discourse indicate that moral discourse simply is a kind of factual discourse.1 However, in recent years a number of interesting attempts have been made in trying to show that the realist appearance of moral discourse can after all be accommodated within a noncognitivist view.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Gunnar Björnsson (2012). Do 'Objectivist' Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism? Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.
Sergio Tenenbaum (2003). Quasi-Realism's Problem of Autonomous Effects. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):392–409.
Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson (2009). Expressivism and Moral Certitude. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):202-215.
Mark Eli Kalderon (2005). Moral Fictionalism. Oxford University Press.
Huw Price (1996). How to Stand Up for Non-Cognitivists. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):275-292.
Guy Kahane (2013). Must Metaethical Realism Make a Semantic Claim? Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2):148-178.
Frederik Kaufman (1992). Moral Realism and Moral Judgments. Erkenntnis 36 (1):103 - 112.
Michael Smith (2002). Evaluation, Uncertainty and Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):305-320.
Cristina Lafont (2003). Procedural Justice?: Implications of the Rawls-Habermas Debate for Discourse Ethics. Philosophy and Social Criticism 29 (2):163-181.
John R. Wright (2006). Moral Discourse, Pluralism, and Moral Cognitivism. Metaphilosophy 37 (1):92–111.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads21 ( #94,490 of 1,684,289 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #112,061 of 1,684,289 )
How can I increase my downloads?